Ukraine is the world’s most mined country, and a significant amount of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) contaminate Ukraine’s farmland. Today, Ukraine’s Ministry of Economy, Environment, and Agriculture estimates that at least 10,000 hectares of farmland potentially contaminated with landmines and UXO are still being cultivated by farmers. Approximately 1 million hectares of farmland remain suspected of contamination, endangering farmers’ lives and limiting the area of land under cultivation. Also limiting cultivation is the destruction of irrigation infrastructure by Russian forces. The Kakhovka Reservoir had supplied the most extensive irrigation system in Ukraine (and Europe), critical for agriculture in southeastern Ukraine. The destruction of the reservoir by Russia in 2023 destroyed significant proportions of irrigation systems in Khersonka, Zaporizka, and Dnipropetrovska oblasts, contaminating farms and leaving roughly 600,000 hectares of farmland without irrigation. The Russian occupation of parts of southern and eastern Ukraine further reduces Ukrainian agricultural output. According to NASA Harvest, approximately 40 percent of Ukraine’s total agricultural output comes from land directly impacted by Russia’s invasion. This land, including parts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizka, and Khersonka oblasts, accounts for significant proportions of Ukraine’s wheat, sunflower seed, millet, and barley production. Russia has appropriated and exported as much as 15 million metric tons of grains grown in these regions, plus Crimea, according to Ukrainian intelligence, since 2022.
Another factor limiting Ukraine’s exports is its access to EU markets. Given Russia’s threats to the safety of Black Sea navigation, Ukraine exported a greater share of its grain exports through the European Union following Russia’s full-scale invasion. Ukraine’s continued exports relied on access to European markets, while a surge in Ukrainian imports caused friction within the European Union. The European Union reimposed safeguards on certain agricultural imports from Ukraine, including grains, in mid-2025, limiting Ukraine’s exports to the region. In October 2025, Ukraine and the European Union reached an agreement over EU imports from Ukraine, though select bordering countries, including Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, continue to impose bans on agricultural imports from Ukraine.
Furthermore, a growing labor shortage presents additional challenges to Ukraine’s agriculture sector. According to a State Statistics Service survey at the end of 2025, more than 20 percent of agricultural companies identified labor shortages as a key factor limiting business development. Mobilization for military service, migration, demographic decline in rural areas, and the destruction of social infrastructure in frontline regions have significantly reduced the availability of skilled and unskilled workers, presenting a barrier to restoring Ukraine’s agricultural production and export capacity.
Finally, Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian agricultural export infrastructure and ships carrying Ukrainian grain continue to threaten the export of Ukrainian agricultural products, drive up insurance costs for cargo vessels in the Black Sea, and depress prices received by Ukrainian producers. Following an increase in Russian attacks on export infrastructure and ships in late 2024, Russia was also implicated in the missile attack of a grain vessel in Odesa, which was carrying wheat to Algeria, killing four people in March 2025; the drone attack of a Turkish vessel carrying Ukrainian sunflower oil to Egypt in mid-December 2025; and drone attacks on two civilian ships preparing to load wheat in the ports of Pivdennyi and Chornomorsk in late December 2025.
Q2: How has Russia’s war affected Russia’s own agriculture sector, four years later?
A2: The main theater of Russia’s war remains Ukraine’s territory, so while Ukraine’s agricultural land is directly affected by warfare, Russia’s grain production and exports have been relatively undiminished by the direct effects of the war. Nonetheless, Russia’s agriculture sector has recently been affected by weather and secondary impacts of the war, threatening Russia’s agricultural economy.
Russia’s wheat exports surged from 39 million metric tons in the 2020–2021 marketing year to a record-setting 55 million metric tons in the 2023–2024 marketing year, due to favorable growing conditions alongside Russia’s unimpeded access to its Black Sea and Azov Sea ports, in addition to appropriation of Ukrainian export infrastructure and grain, which Russia added to its harvest and sold as its own. By 2024, a full 22 percent of wheat on global markets was of Russian origin, offering Moscow opportunities to utilize its agricultural exports, chiefly wheat, for political leverage in food-importing countries. Russian agricultural exports increased in value relative to its other exports, including energy, leading Moscow to increase its emphasis on agricultural exports in its economic plans. In May 2024, Russian state media outlet RT reported that Putin aimed for Russia to have the fourth-highest GDP in the world by 2030, driven by a shift in exports “away from energy products, with agriculture considered a significant driver of future foreign trade.” By late 2024, Russia was reported to have set a price floor for its wheat exports, attempting to ensure continued revenue amid falling global grain prices.
Following the 2023–2024 surge, Russian wheat exports leveled off and, because adverse weather has reduced harvests in some parts of the country, wheat exports are estimated at 44 million metric tons for the 2025–2026 marketing year, marking a 20 percent decline from the 2023–2024 record. At the same time, according to Russia’s agriculture minister, Russia’s farm sector is losing approximately 150,000 agricultural workers per year, consistent with persistent labor shortages nationwide. Still, in July 2025, Russia’s Minister of Agriculture maintained that Russian grain exports for the 2024–2025 marketing year were consistent with the five-year average, and that Russia continued to “expand the geography of exports” with 11 new countries importing Russian grain and seven countries that had stopped importing from Russia resuming purchases. Moscow continues to aim to increase its grain exports by 50 percent through 2030, but, anticipating growing competition from other grain producers, Moscow is reported to be emphasizing its seeds and agricultural technologies among its major agricultural exports. Russia recently accused a U.S. fund that owns major agricultural assets in Russia of extremism, an accusation often levied to justify state seizures of foreign assets consistent with seizures of agricultural assets of major Western firms, including NCH Capital, Danone, and a U.S.-owned canned food company, reportedly to secure the Russian food supply and feed the Russian army.
Today, Russia continues to incorporate Ukrainian land and production infrastructure into its grain-export efforts, decreasing Ukraine’s exports and increasing the volume of grains considered to be Russian on global markets. Satellite imagery indicates a high intensity of activity in the occupied territories, showing maximum plowing rates and near-complete utilization of arable land. In 2025, Russia reportedly stole over 2 million tons of Ukrainian grain from occupied territories, exported grains via ports in the Azov and Black Seas using a shadow fleet, and directed it to markets in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, with nearly 40 percent shipped to Egypt. Ukrainian authorities have sanctioned dozens of ships and captains involved, emphasizing that this illicit trade not only distorts global food markets but also finances Russia’s war effort. Such practices not only expand Russia’s resource base but also create long-term challenges for Ukraine’s postwar agricultural recovery, restitution of property rights, and reintegration of occupied lands into Ukraine’s economic framework.
In addition to grains, Russia is a top exporter of fertilizer to global markets, conferring significant revenue and influence for Moscow. CSIS analysis shows uneven impacts of the war on Russia’s exports of nitrogen (anhydrous ammonia, urea), phosphate (diammonium phosphate, or DAP), and potassium (potash) fertilizers. Russia’s exports of potash fell in 2022, likely due to indirect effects of sanctions imposed on Russia by Western countries. Though sanctions explicitly exempted Russia’s food and fertilizer exports, they implicated the financial systems used to purchase agricultural products, complicating financial transactions and discouraging purchases from Russia. According to CSIS analysis, Russia’s exports of potash have recovered dramatically; some of this increase could represent potash exports from Belarus being transshipped through Russia, while the increase could also be due to the export of Russian fertilizer through friendly countries in order to avoid sanctions. Before Russia invaded Ukraine, Russia had exported most of its anhydrous ammonia through the Togliatti-Odesa pipeline. Operation of the pipeline ceased following Russia’s invasion in early 2022. The pipeline was damaged and rendered inoperable in June 2023, and CSIS analysis shows that Russia’s exports of anhydrous ammonia fell significantly through 2025. Exports of urea and DAP have not significantly changed since 2022. Global fertilizer prices spiked following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, had receded by 2023, and are increasing today due to strong demand and rising input prices.