A US Coast Guard (USCG) report has warned that America’s port infrastructure is increasingly vulnerable to the changing scale and patterns of commercial maritime traffic.
The Ports and Waterways Safety Act Board of Inquiry report, made public on 4 September, found that existing waterway risk-assessment tools have been underused and have not kept pace with the evolving risks facing US ports and waterways. The report highlights gaps in how these tools are applied, raising concerns over whether critical maritime infrastructure is being adequately assessed as vessel sizes and traffic volumes continue to increase.
The findings come in the aftermath of the March 26, 2024, casualty involving the Singapore-flagged containership Dali, which struck Pier 17 of Baltimore’s Francis Scott Key Bridge, triggering the catastrophic collapse of the bridge’s superstructure. Six people were killed, and the Port of Baltimore was forced to close for an extended period.
The incident underscored the vulnerability of critical infrastructure at US ports to risks that may not have been fully anticipated. It also highlighted the growing challenges posed by larger commercial vessels and increasing traffic volumes, both domestic and international, and the evolving risks these trends present to the US Maritime Transportation System (MTS), including national safety, security and emergency preparedness.
Following the casualty, the Coast Guard’s Deputy Commandant for Operations convened the Ports and Waterways Safety Act Board of Inquiry under Title 46 of the United States Code, § 70035.
The Board was tasked with examining four key areas: assessing the risks that larger commercial vessels and rising traffic density pose to critical port infrastructure; conducting comprehensive vulnerability assessments of 10 selected ports; evaluating the effectiveness and historical use of existing Coast Guard tools for assessing risks in US waterways; and developing recommendations for the Coast Guard Commandant.
The Board’s investigation highlighted the growing complexity of assessing risks across the US Maritime Transportation System (MTS), and the need for a more coordinated approach within the Coast Guard.
Critical infrastructure at risk
Deepwater channels and bridges were identified by maritime stakeholders as the most important categories of critical infrastructure during the Board’s visits to ports. Ocean jetties and their openings, navigation aids, and locks, levees and dams were also repeatedly highlighted.
Industry-specific infrastructure, including cargo terminals, was considered highly important where disruption would have significant regional consequences.
The Board also found that the scale and density of maritime traffic are changing. Ports reported receiving larger commercial vessels over the past decade, while several also reported increases in commercial traffic density. In some cases, however, larger ships have resulted in fewer commercial vessel transits.
Recreational traffic is also increasing, with several ports identifying congestion involving recreational boats as a potential contributor to worst-case incidents. Stakeholders called for better communication between recreational and commercial vessel operators.
Response capacity remains a concern
Ports also raised concerns about emergency response capabilities, with numerous stakeholders reporting that available resources had been significantly degraded or were not readily accessible when needed.
Shortfalls in oil-spill response organisations and salvage capacity could exacerbate the consequences of a major incident, potentially extending delays and disrupting the flow of commerce for longer periods.
Safety and security risks remain fragmented
The Board also identified a disconnect between how the Coast Guard assesses maritime safety risks and security threats.
While the two are managed separately, port stakeholders frequently described incidents in terms that cut across both categories. Safety assessments focus on preventing accidents and ensuring safe navigation, while security assessments address intentional threats such as terrorism, piracy and other illegal activity.
The Board warned that managing the two sets of risks can involve difficult trade-offs. Measures intended to strengthen security, such as increased surveillance or tighter regulation, can affect the efficiency of maritime trade. At the same time, greater reliance on digital systems for vessel operations increases exposure to cyberattacks.
There is also a tension between transparency and security. Sharing information is essential for identifying and managing risks, but excessive disclosure of sensitive operational details could expose vulnerabilities to potential adversaries.
Lack of coordination and consistent policy
A central finding of the investigation was the lack of an overarching Coast Guard policy to coordinate the various risk-assessment tools and programmes.
The Board found inconsistent definitions across different risk-management programmes, making it difficult to collect and compare data consistently. Existing waterways risk-assessment tools are also not reviewed or updated according to a regular schedule.
The Coast Guard’s historically reactive approach to developing and retiring risk policies has further undermined consistency, the Board found. Some policies and tools have been introduced, used for a period and later abandoned, sometimes following changes in personnel or leadership priorities.
The Board said the Coast Guard needs to distinguish between tools required for enduring missions and those created in response to temporary priorities, ensuring that effective policies are not discarded simply because personnel or leadership changes.
Oversight is another weakness. The Board found that existing MTS risk-assessment tools lack sufficient supervision to ensure they are being used consistently and in accordance with policy. Overall use of the available waterways risk tools in the field was found to be low, potentially weakening risk-informed decision-making and affecting both safety and operational efficiency.
Training and expertise gaps
The investigation also identified shortcomings in personnel training and specialist expertise.
Consistent use of waterways risk-assessment tools requires both a grounding in risk-assessment principles and training in the application of specific tools. The Board found that the Coast Guard has not given this area sufficient priority from either a policy or training perspective.
It also found no clear, cohesive pathway for developing specialist expertise in MTS risk assessment. Organisational fragmentation and an imbalance in resources have contributed to the problem, leaving risk-management expertise dispersed across different programmes and parts of the Coast Guard.
Taken together, the findings point to a broader challenge: the Coast Guard has a range of risk-assessment tools and significant experience in managing maritime risks, but lacks the governance, consistency, training and oversight needed to apply them effectively across an increasingly complex and congested MTS.